The Implications of Domestic Party Ideologies on Refugee Policy: A Case Study of Bangladesh and the Rohingya by Schiffer, Samuel S
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Honors Undergraduate Theses UCF Theses and Dissertations 
2018 
The Implications of Domestic Party Ideologies on Refugee Policy: 
A Case Study of Bangladesh and the Rohingya 
Samuel S. Schiffer 
University of Central Florida 
 Part of the Comparative Politics Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the UCF Theses and Dissertations at STARS. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Undergraduate Theses by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more 
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
Recommended Citation 
Schiffer, Samuel S., "The Implications of Domestic Party Ideologies on Refugee Policy: A Case Study of 
Bangladesh and the Rohingya" (2018). Honors Undergraduate Theses. 307. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses/307 
 
 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF DOMESTIC PARTY IDEOLOGIES ON REFUGEE 
POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF BANGLADESH AND THE ROHINGYA 
 
 
by 
 
SAMUEL S. SCHIFFER 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
 for the Honors in the Major Program in Political Science 
 in the College of Sciences 
 and in the Burnett Honors College 
 at the University of Central Florida  
Orlando, Florida 
 
 
 
Spring Term, 2018 
 
 
 
Thesis Chair: Nikola Mirilovic, PhD.
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Why do some political parties in Bangladesh discriminate against the Rohingya, while 
some do not? Much has been written about the conflict in Myanmar, but the plight of Rohingya 
in Bangladesh remains understudied. This lack of understanding is underscored by the five 
million Syrian refugees fleeing their own civil war that dominates the news and the attention of 
scholars. The Rohingya, however, are stateless: they are denied citizenship in their native 
Myanmar and are forced to find refuge in whichever country will take them.  
Much has been published that links immigration policy to security considerations and the 
national identity and ethnic homogeneity of the host country. I argue that it is the domestic 
politics of Bangladesh that directly influences the policies concerning, and subsequent treatment 
of, the Rohingya migrants. This leads back to the question I pose: why is it that some political 
parties in Bangladesh actively support the ethnic group while others actively discriminate against 
the Rohingya? I argue that it is the individual ideologies of that party that can be directly 
attributed to their stance on Rohingya. Using qualitative analysis, I measure how a party's 
foreign policy, social policy, and political ideology affects that organization’s attitude toward 
Rohingya refugees. Understanding the largely political nature of refugee policy will allow 
policy-makers, intergovernmental organizations, and human rights groups to be better equipped 
to improve the conditions of, not only the Rohingya population, but other vulnerable refugee 
groups that seek safety in foreign states. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Why do some political parties in Bangladesh discriminate against the Rohingya, while 
some do not?  Much has been written about the conflict in Myanmar, but the plight of Rohingya 
in Bangladesh remains understudied.  With estimates putting the number of Rohingya refugees in 
Bangladesh at 800,000, substantive research on why they are mistreated is left wanting.  This 
lack of understanding is underscored by the five million Syrian refugees fleeing their own civil 
war that dominates the news and the attention of scholars.  The Rohingya, however, are stateless: 
they are denied citizenship in their native Myanmar and are forced to find refuge in whichever 
country will take them.  This entails perilous journeys in the Bengal Sea with potential 
destination countries literally pushing them away, back out to sea.  For this reason, many seek 
safety in Bangladesh, which shares a small land border with Myanmar. 
Much has been published that links immigration policy to security considerations and the 
national identity and ethnic homogeneity of the host country.  I argue that it is the domestic 
politics of Bangladesh that directly influences the policies concerning, and subsequent treatment 
of, the Rohingya migrants.  This leads back to the question I pose: why is it that some political 
parties in Bangladesh actively support the ethnic group while others actively discriminate against 
the Rohingya?  I believe that it is the individual ideologies of that party that can be directly 
attributed to their stance on Rohingya.  Using qualitative analysis, I will measure how a party's 
social policy and political ideology affects that organization’s attitude toward Rohingya 
refugees.  Understanding the largely political nature of refugee policy will allow policy-makers, 
intergovernmental organizations, and human rights groups to be better equipped to improve the 
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conditions of, not only the Rohingya population, but other vulnerable refugee groups that seek 
safety in foreign states.   
The United Nations determines a refugee to be:  
A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it.1 
For the purpose of this study, the above UN definition of a refugee will be used to 
describe the Rohingya migrants.  They are the victims of sectarian persecution in Myanmar, 
involving rape, displacement, and killing.  They are also denied citizenship in Myanmar, further 
placing them within the confines of the UN definition as “...not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence…”   
Because worldwide refugee numbers are ever-increasing, this study will focus on the 
Rohingya experience outside of Myanmar as a refugee in Bangladesh and act as a case study of 
the implications domestic politics have on refugee populations within host countries.  There is an 
abundance of scholarly work on the factors that lead to immigration policy, including security, 
political economy, and even domestic politics.  Yet there is a lack of focus on the specific effects 
that host country party politics have on refugee policy.  The focus is normally placed on the 
                                                     
1 United Nations. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees. Geneva: n.p., 1951. Print. 
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country policy as a whole, rather than identifying the internal dynamics of the various political 
voices.  This study seeks to expand the literature on immigration policy by including a specific 
instance of party ideologies having a direct effect on refugee public policy.   
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BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Starting with “Operation: Dragon King” in 1977, a clear pattern of genocidal tendencies 
can be found being perpetrated by the Burmese government against the Rohingya in the Rakhine 
State.  This pattern is identified in the report, “Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide in 
Myanmar”.2  The report contends that the Myanmar government is carrying out a silent genocide 
against the ethnic group right under the world’s nose.  Identifying specific steps in the process of 
a genocide, according to Daniel Feierstein, the report then applies what the Burmese government 
has done, or is attempting to do, to those steps to build their case.   
In Human Rights Watch’s report on the violence against the Rohingya in the Rakhine 
State, they document the promotion of ethnic violence against the minority group, coordinated 
attacks and abuses, mass graves of Rohingya, humanitarian concerns, denial of citizenship, and 
the legal standards of ethnic cleansing as a crime against humanity.3  For a more detailed 
description and documentation of the conditions of the Rohingya in Myanmar, Chris Lewa, 
coordinator for the Arakan Project, has published a report providing a background of the 
Rohingya’s state in Myanmar and their reasons for fleeing to Bangladesh.4 
With the scores of Rohingya moving out of the Rakhine State, a significant migrant 
problem has been created in Southeast Asia.  In Eileen Pittaway’s “The Rohingya Refugees in 
Bangladesh: A Failure of the International Protection Regime”, she describes the shortcomings 
of the global response to protect the ethnic group, with a particular focus on the status of 
                                                     
2 de la Cour Venning, Alicia, et al. Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide in Myanmar.  
International State Crime Initiative, 2015 
3 Human Rights Watch. "All You Can Do Is Pray": Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya 
Muslims in Burma's Arakan State. Human Rights Watch, 2012,"All You Can Do Is Pray": Crimes Against Humanity 
and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma's Arakan State. 
4 The Arakan Project. Unregistered Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Crackdown, Forced Displacement and 
Hunger. Asia-Pacific Refugee Rights Network, 2010. 
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Rohingya in Bangladesh.  She contends that the international community has been “unwilling 
and unable to offer an effective solution” and that failure to act has manifested itself in 
Bangladesh.5  Pittway states that three durable solutions have not been achieved: “voluntary 
repatriation to the home country, local integration in the country of asylum, and resettlement in a 
third country.”6 
By 1978, 200,000 Rohingya had fled into Bangladesh.  Because of this massive influx, 
Bangladesh had to request assistance from the United Nations to help support the refugees.  
Bangladesh then suspended all movement of Rohingya into the country and deemed all the 
persons in the country as illegal immigrants with no official status as refugees.  It was then that 
the UN stepped in and threatened to withdraw aid from Burma if they did not agree to take back 
the Rohingya.7  Burma reluctantly agreed, and between 1993 and 1997, 230,000 Rohingya were 
forcefully returned to Burma.  In an interview conducted by the UNHCR with individual 
refugees, it was found that only 30 percent of Rohingya wished to return to Burma while 
Bangladesh insisted that they all return.8 
Local integration, Pittway contends, has also been non existent in Bangladesh.  To be 
locally integrated, a refugee must become members of the host society legally, economically, and 
politically.9  The Bangladeshi government has made this extremely hard for the UNHRC to 
achieve as Bangladesh continues to reject any sort of local integration.  Not only are they denied 
status as official refugees, but they are subject to sexual violence, malnutrition, and insufficient 
                                                     
5 Pittaway, Eileen. "The Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: A Failure of the International Protection 
Regime." Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home. London: Ashgate, 2008. 83-104. Print. Law, 
Ethics, and Governance Ser. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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health care and education by the Bangladeshi government.  This leaves the Rohingya depended 
on international human rights regimes whose goal for the group is to become self-sufficient in 
Bangladesh.  Until the cycle of abuse stops from Bangladesh, the Rohingya will remain tethered 
to the UNHCR and other groups that are already limited to act in the country.10 
Pittaway concludes with her assessment on the 3rd country resettlement of Rohingya 
refugees in Bangladesh.  According to her, “Resettlement has come to be seen as the only way in 
which they can regain a meaningful life”.11  In 2007, the UNHCR instigated a resettlement 
program for the Rohingya, but countries only accepted refugees based on their ability to integrate 
into their society rather than those in greatest need.12  The trauma that they experience in 
Bangladesh, the poor health status, and low levels of education all combine to make Rohingya 
migrants unlikely to fit “integration criteria” of prospective host countries.13 
While the Rohingya crisis coming out of Myanmar is the most pressing instance of 
protracted displacement in South Asia, there is a larger issue of displaced persons throughout the 
world.  In Michael G. Smith’s “Better Approaches to Protracted Displacement?” he identifies 
problems in reconciling “the inherent tension between humanitarianism and realpolitik”.14  How 
can a host country balance universal morality with national self-interest?  Smith argues that there 
are no durable solutions to protracted displacement, but enduring solutions, which require 
refugees to wait and endure their situations for years without resolution.15  This acts as no 
solution at all and only proves the international community’s inability to provide adequate 
                                                     
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Smith, Michael G. "Better Approaches to Protracted Displacement?" Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place 
to Call Home (2008): 209. 
15 Ibid. 
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protections for those in protracted displacement.16  The UNHCR has advocated against a “care 
and maintenance” approach that will create a cycle of dependence on the international human 
rights regimes, but few alternatives present themselves.17  
In his paper, Smith identifies the Rohingya issue as a good example of protracted 
displacement that, unfortunately, is one that is only fit for an enduring solution.  However, he 
presents four key lessons for humanitarian agencies that emerge from the crisis.  First, agencies 
must mobilize support and advocate greater attention for the Rohingya.18  Second, the UN in 
particular must follow through with its humanitarian mandate regardless of the political 
challenges.19  Third, assistance to the Rohingya needs to be combined with assistance to the local 
Bangladesh communities.  This will increase chances for local integration and lower animosity 
between the two groups.20  Finally, immediate attention must be given to a resettlement program 
as the caseload of Rohingya in Bangladesh represents a relatively small population compared to 
other displaced persons in the world.21 
Some explanations of the Rohingya treatment in Bangladesh can be attributed to larger 
issues of democratization, or the lack thereof, in Southeast Asia that can affect immigration 
policy.  Stephen Castles provides theories relating to the issues of migration, citizenship, and 
ethnicity.  Castles goes on to describe the fragile relationship between democratization and 
citizen rights, which he sees as being affected by “immigration and the development of new 
                                                     
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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forms of ethno-cultural diversity”.22  According to Castles, the more heterogeneous its 
population is in terms of ethnicity, the harder it is to build a democratic system of government.  
Therefore, immigration, the adding of new ethnicities to the pool of residents in the state, will 
hinder that state’s ability to achieve democracy.23  This can, in turn, lead young, developing 
states to adopt restrictive immigration policies or harsh laws on migrants once they are in the 
country.  He applies this to Southeast Asia in three ways.   
First, the European model of homogeneity and the theory of the “nation-state” did not 
have the time it needed to develop in Asia.  No autonomous cities developed that could challenge 
the power of the rulers as what happened in Europe.  Instead, peasant rebellions merely 
established new dynasties that did not change the political structure.24  Second, the notion of the 
nation - state and citizenship was brought to the region through colonialism, a practice marred by 
repression, racism, and exploitation.  This can be seen in Bangladesh with the presence of Great 
Britain in the 19th century.  While the colonial liberation movements attempted to take over the 
government system put in place by the colonial powers, the democratic citizen had not evolved 
in the region to translate that liberation into a successful, western democracy - type government.  
Dictatorships and authoritarianism became widespread.25  Finally, the states in Southeast Asia 
did not have time to homogenize the way Western states did in order to implement successful 
democracy.  Many times, the labor movement spurred by colonialists brought ethnicities from 
other countries into new regions that further muddled the ethnic homogeneity of the country.26 
                                                     
22 Castles, Stephen. New migrations, ethnicity and nationalism in southeast and east Asia. University of Oxford. 
Transnational Communities Programme, 1998. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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This can also be seen in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and Myanmar when the British needed men 
to tend the colonial rice fields.   
In another paper by Castles, “Why Migration Policies Fail”, he argues that “difficulties in 
implementing migration policies arise to a large extent from the interactions… between the 
political systems of the states involved”.27  Castles goes on to describe the factions in a political 
system and how their perceptions of migrants can lead to discord in the government and result in 
contradictory and ineffective immigration policy.  Migration can be seen as advantageous by 
some groups, and a threat to others.  Some people may see migrant settlement in their 
neighborhoods as harmful “because they feel it will worsen housing conditions, while others may 
see immigration as a source of urban renewal and a more vibrant cultural mix.”28  According to 
Castles, “Politicians, social movements and the media all have a role in shaping and directing 
people's reactions to migration.”29 However, “The strength of nationalism and racism in 
immigration countries has made it easier to mobilize public opinion against immigration than for 
it.”30 
As a developing country, Bangladesh must consider immigration in the larger scheme of 
its nation building process.  Like what Castles argues, Harris Mylonas agrees that ethnic and 
national homogeneity are necessary to build a nation state.  Immigration throws a wrench into 
this process by adding new ethnicities and nationalities to the mix.  Mylonas argues that the 
“core group” in the host country, the inhabitants of the country that share the same national type, 
is represented by the ruling elite in that country.  That ruling elite aims at the survival of the state 
                                                     
27 Castles, Stephen. "Why migration policies fail." Ethnic and racial studies 27.2 (2004): 205-227. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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and their position in it and will not rest until the nation building is complete, which entails the 
removal or silencing of all threatening non-core actors in the state.  The ruling elite is driven by a 
homogenizing imperative.31  Mylonas puts forth a few theories regarding immigration policies in 
these nation building states.  
 First, he looks at the state capacity in absolute terms.  Does the state have the ability to 
implement its nation building policies, or not?  If they do not, they will attempt an 
accommodationist stance as the state apparatus does not have the ability to fully assimilate the 
non-core group into the core group.32  Next, Mylonas puts forth the idea that the salience and 
homogeneity of the non-core group in question will have an impact on their treatment by the 
ruling class of the host country.  If the group is nomadic, isolated, and/or small, members will 
quickly assimilate into the upper echelons of the core group to increase their social esteem.  
Otherwise, if the non-core group is very strong in their ethnic, religions, or territorial bond, the 
core group will act more hostile to the non-core group and see it as a threat.  The non-core group 
will seek to establish a beachhead in the host country with a political identity in the form of 
cultural, linguistic, and religious links.  The ruling class of the host country will fear external 
powers supporting the non-core group in an attempt to destabilize the country.33  Finally, 
Mylonas describes how the political demands of the non-core group can influence their 
subsequent treatment in the host country.  Demands can range from non-territorial rights, such as 
recognition as citizens and political participation, to territorial demands in which the non-core 
group claims autonomy or independence from the state.  Conversely, demands from the non-core 
                                                     
31 Mylonas, Harris. Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. N.p.: Cambridge U 
Press, 2013. Print. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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group can be influenced by their treatment from the host country.  Violence directed at the non-
core group can lead to an escalation of the group's demands unless they are totally suppressed.34 
Politics and ideology are discussed by Russell as an overlooked factor when seeking out 
the determinants of immigration policy.  In her case study of Kuwait, Russell sees politics and 
political interest groups “at the intersection of objectives and determinants” of migration 
policy.35  Political actors will perceive the different aspects of the migrant group, particularly 
their labor impact, as either favorable to their agenda or unfavorable and act accordingly.  She 
goes on to describe how members of the Kuwaiti merchant elites and the newer commercial 
interests have pushed for liberal entry policies, then restrictive rights once they are in the 
country.  These groups will also oppose naturalization.36  Conversely, Kuwaiti Nationalists, 
comprising of the poorer members of society, tend to support policies that restrict the entry of 
foreign nationals and oppose giving rights to the ones who reside in the country.37  In addition to 
the labor considerations of political actors, recent political events, security issues, economic 
conditions, demographic change, positions of political actors in policy making process, and 
perceived social costs and consequences of immigration all need to be taken into account when 
governments adopt the immigration policies that they do.38   
Russell’s theory does well to highlight the need to pay attention to ideology and politics 
of state actors as shaping the direction of the immigration phenomenon.  However, Russell’s 
argument assumes that the migrants are moving into the host state to solely seek employment.  
                                                     
34 Ibid. 
35 Russell, Sharon Stanton. "Politics and Ideology in Migration Policy Formulation: The Case of 
Kuwait." International Migration Review 23.1 (1989): 24-27. Print. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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Political actors and interest groups build their opinions of the migrants based the impact they will 
make on the labor market.  Refugees are largely kept out of the equation as they may seek 
employment, citizenship, and asylum from a hostile and dangerous home state.  These other 
aspects of the immigrant needs and demands must be taken into account.   
Regime type is discussed as an important predictor in immigration policy by Nikola 
Mirilovic.  Making a comparison between democracies and dictatorship, he argues that while 
many immigrants would prefer to live in the former, the demand for immigrants is higher in the 
latter.39  In democracies, immigrants are given access to the welfare state and are granted 
political rights that inherently make living in the state a better option.  However, immigration 
policy in these countries remain restrictive, whereas in dictatorships, there is a permissive policy 
towards migrant admissions.  Bangladesh, however, does not fall into the polar regime types that 
he describes in his theory.  The country has a history of vacillating between authoritarian rule 
and liberal democracy.  Therefore, it is imperative to analyze the internal dynamics of the 
Bangladeshi political systems, namely the political parties.  
Western democracies, having the most developed political institutions and party 
ideologies, provide an important setting for looking at the effects of party politics and ideology 
on immigration policy.  Gallya Lahav argues that ideological orientations and party affiliation 
structure elite attitudes towards the immigration issue in Europe.40  Looking at members of 
European parliament, Lahav has found that elites from the different parties have attitudes that are 
distinct.41  The “left-right construct” organizes policy makers when it comes to preferences of 
                                                     
39 Mirilovic, Nikola. “The Politics of Immigration: Dictatorship, Development, and Defense.” Comparative Politics, 
vol. 42, no. 3, 2010, pp. 273–292. 
40 Lahav, Gallya. "Ideological and party constraints on immigration attitudes in Europe." JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies 35.3 (1997): 377-406. 
41 Ibid. 
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migrants and the policies that govern them.42  She has found that policy makers on the left are 
more likely to amend social inequalities that migrants face and seek to extend their rights than 
their counterparts on the right.43  Her report flies in the face of recent assertions that party 
affiliation and ideology have eroded and have become largely symbolic when deciding policy in 
Europe.  Lahav has found that parties and their ideologies have remained significant in 
immigration discourse and continue to shape the dialogue on immigrant entry.44  She debunks 
the idea that the creation of a European parliament and intergovernmental framework somehow 
antiquates party affiliation and ideology.  These ties to ideas and perceptions of culture still 
inform the decision making when it comes to immigration policy.   
As well as Lahav makes the case for party affiliation and ideology as a predictor for 
immigration policy, her argument is limited to the borders of Europe and advanced Western 
international governance.  Bangladesh is a country that formed in the latter half of the 20th 
century and lacks the hundreds of years it took for complex democratic institutions to form.  The 
country is prone to regime change and does not have the stability required for political discourse 
that does not result in either a coup or civil war.  This paper seeks to make the case for party and 
ideology as a predictor for immigration policy in the context of a lesser developed country.  
                                                     
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
 Immigration and refugee populations have been the subject of a myriad amount of studies 
and scholarly attention.  Security issues, the wealth of the host nation, and ethnic differences are 
all cited as useful and proven justifications for a restrictive and discriminatory policy against 
immigrants and refugees.  However, most of the literature concerns host states that are Western, 
advanced democracies, like the United States and European Union countries.  These states have 
had hundreds of years to establish stable, democratic institutions that have evolved over time and 
are able to withstand political discourse and competition without falling victim to a coup or a 
regime change.  Bangladesh presents an interesting case because it does not have the advanced 
hallmarks of democracy, like free and fair elections, independent branches of government, or 
healthy political competition.  Therefore, it deserves a unique lens through which to study its 
immigration policy, particularly concerning the Rohingya.  In immigration literature, it is argued 
that security, economic policy, and ethnic differences provide the reasons behind a state’s 
immigration policy.  I argue that these factors as explanations do not apply to Bangladesh.   
 Security is the most commonly used justification for an immigration policy.  This can be 
seen in the Trump Administration’s attempted block of migrants from Muslim-majority countries 
and Syrian refugees in the United States and the National Front’s platform of restricted 
immigration in France.  The literature can serve these cases just fine as they are countries that 
have experienced considerable terrorist attacks from people who were not citizens of the state, 
the September 11 attacks in the United States, and the multiple terror attacks in France since the 
rise of the Islamic State in 2015.  However, when applying this analytical framework to a 
country like Bangladesh, the pieces do not fit together as nicely as they do in other cases.   
15 
 
 Christopher Rudolph is among one of the scholars that argues there is a significant 
security concern when states enact immigration policy.  He admits, though, that many of the 
theories he posits do not apply to developing countries.  This is because his theses are 
interwoven with political economy considerations that are really only applicable in advanced, 
Western, industrialized nations.45   
 In Utpala Rahman’s “The Rohingya Refugee: A Security Dilemma for Bangladesh”, the 
Rohingya migrant is a threat to the internal stability of Bangladesh and a source of inter-state 
tension between the country and Myanmar.  She portrays the refugee group as a political, 
economic, social, environmental, and human security threat.  The solution, according to Rahman, 
is for Bangladesh to enact a policy that will lift the Rohingya migrants from their current state of 
despondency in order to keep them out of encampment and subsequent militarization.46 
Rahman contends that the Rohingya camps in Cox’s Bazar are fertile grounds for 
recruitment by Islamic militants.47  The Rohingya Solidarity Organization, a militant 
organization created by the Rohingya minority in Myanmar to achieve independence, has moved 
into Bangladesh with the thousands of others escaping Rakhine.  The RSO now operates in 
Bangladesh with support from other Islamic militant groups in the country, most notably the 
Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB).48  Rahman continues to state that the Rohingyas 
protracted status in refugee camps only bolster their ties to armed groups that seek to harm the 
government and people of Bangladesh.   
                                                     
45 Rudolph, Christopher. “Security and the Political Economy of International Migration.” The American Political 
Science Review, vol. 97, no. 4, 2003, pp. 603–620. 
46 Rahman, Utpala. "The Rohingya Refugee: A Security Dilemma for Bangladesh." Journal of  
Immigrant & Refugee Studies 8.2 (2010): 233-39. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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Rahman also sees the Rohingya as competing with Bangladeshis workers for jobs on the 
Myanmar - Bangladesh border that, in turn, creates hostilities and lead to clashes between ethnic 
groups.49  In addition, the large amounts of Rohingya place a strain on the already limited 
resources in the area, contributing to tensions between “newcomers and native populations”.50  
This resource strain can also be seen in the environmental degradation of the area as refugees cut 
down timber to build shelters.  This places the Rohingya in direct competition with the native 
Bangladeshis who also depend on the natural resources in the area for their livelihood.51 
First, the security threat the Bangladesh faces is almost all internal.  The product of a 
brutal liberation war in 1971, Bangladesh has a history of rape, murder, and genocide woven into 
its history of a sovereign nation.  During the conflict, the Yahya Khan regime of Pakistan sent 
his troops to Dhaka, the capital city of the Bengali nationalists and unleased a large siege of the 
city for two days.52  According to eyewitness accounts, 15,000 Bengalis had lost their lives, the 
most notable being the murder of 17 professors and 200 students on the Dhaka University 
campus.53  The results of the war left a significant number of Pakistani supporters in Bangladesh 
after the war to represent the interests of Pakistan.  Most notably, the Jamaat-e-Islamic political 
party, which fought on the side of Pakistan during the war and was charged with committing 
some of the worst atrocities during the conflict, including the murder of the Bengali intellectuals 
in March of 1971.54  Rather than expressing political differences in a setting of peaceful 
discourse, Bangladesh has been plagued by the expression of political activism in the form of 
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political terrorism.  One of the most notable occurred in 2004 when fundamentalist Islamist 
terrorists from Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami perpetrated a grenade attack against the Awami League 
leadership during an anti-terrorism rally.  The man behind the attacks was Mufti Abdul Hannan, 
a Bangladeshi citizen.55 
Second, the RSO that Rahman contends poses a threat to Bangladeshi national security 
has been long defunct.  Formed as a response to the Burmese military’s crackdown in the late 
1970s, the RSO was just one of the nationalist groups that was formed by Rohingya after the 
refugee crisis and the dismal conditions they were subject to.  Seeking to secure greater rights for 
the Rohingya within Burma, the organization was targeted as a terrorist organization by the 
Burmese government.56  With purported and dubious claims of having ties with Jamaat-e-Islami 
and other extremist organizations, the RSO was largely confined to the Cox’s Bazar area of 
Bangladesh that held the major population centers for Rohingya migrants in the country.  From 
there, the RSO carried out localized military attacks against the Burmese forces that were 
responsible for the atrocities in the Rakhine State.57  The organization experienced a permanent 
decline in 2001 when the Bangladeshi government targeted the group’s training camps.58  By 
promulgating this myth of Rohingya terrorism, the government of Myanmar has caught the 
attention of established terror networks, like Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, and Jamaah Ansharut 
Tauhid.  These groups have expressed solidarity with the plight of the Rohingya and have called 
for attacks on the Burmese military and Buddhists in Myanmar.59  This is negative publicity that 
affects the Rohingya’s credibility as a vulnerable group.  And as a vulnerable group, they have 
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been largely insulated against the wider Islamic world, making any claim of ties to international 
terror networks extremely far-fetched.   
Finally, the claims of worker conflict in Bangladesh between Bangladeshi workers and 
Rohingya is also overexaggerated, if not outright false.  There is no competition for work in 
Rohingya population centers in Bangladesh because they Bangladeshi government is not letting 
the Rohingya work.60 
 Many will argue that Bangladesh is being hostile to Rohingya refugees because they are a 
poor, densely populated state that cannot sustain the addition of hundreds of thousands of more 
people.  While it is objectively true to state that Bangladesh may not be able to absorb the 
migrants into their state without extreme strain put on resources, to make a blanket statement 
about all the political voices as sharing that opinion is misguided.  There are many different 
voices coming from major opposition parties that are not in power and cannot enact official 
policy.  The purpose of this study is to investigate why different political parties in Bangladesh 
are treating the Rohingya differently.   
 Gary Freeman makes the argument that a state’s welfare status determines their 
immigration policy.  He posits that, because the welfare state has to provide extensively for its 
citizens, it will react negatively to the addition of more citizens as it will eventually become 
impossible for the state to sustain its social programs.  The state must insulate itself from the 
labor that flows from state to state in an open immigration system.61  However, Freeman’s theory 
assumes that each state has a homogenous political attitude that either supports the idea of a 
welfare state or denies it outright.  For socially democratic states like Norway, Denmark, and 
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Sweden, the theory fits nicely as the provisions of a welfare state are woven into the country’s 
identity.  The theory, however, does not account for politically heterogenous states like 
Bangladesh that consistently vacillate between liberal and socialist economic structures.  It is 
necessary, therefore, to understand the individual policies and ideologies of each party to fully 
understand what determines their immigration policy, particularly concerning the Rohingya.   
  It is argued that the ethnic makeup of a state will determine its reception of immigrants.  
According to popular and scholarly belief, if the immigrant group’s ethnicity is different than the 
host state’s, then the host state will pursue restrictive policies against that immigrant group.  That 
Bangladesh has pursued a restrictive and discriminatory policy against the Rohingya is a sign of 
their ethnic differences with the migrant group is false for two reasons.  First, the Rohingya share 
almost the same ethnicity as native Bengali’s, as well as religious beliefs.  While there is 
significant political discourse surrounding the ethnicity and history of the Rohingya in Western 
Myanmar, it is agreed upon by a majority of anthropology and historical scholars that the group 
is descended from a variety of Arab Muslim traders who came to the Arakan Kingdom in the 8th 
century A.D.62  The Arakan Kingdom, at the height of its existence, comprised of the land 
stretching from Chittagong (present day Bangladesh) to the present day Rakhine State in 
Myanmar.6364  Second, there is variation within the political discourse as to the policy that should 
be taken against the Rohingya.  There are parties out of the ruling government that take very 
different stances on the Rohingya than the ruling powers.   
 While flawed in its assumptions of American identity and culture, Samuel Huntington 
has been the biggest proponent of identity and ethnicity differences as an obstacle to 
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immigration.  He posits that Hispanic migration into the United States is problematic because it 
would be impossible for them to assimilate into the American identity.65  This is a case study that 
provides a micro empirical example of a macro principle: ethnicity and identity are key 
determinants to immigration policy.  While some would argue that this can be applied to justify 
the treatment of the Rohingya in Bangladesh, it cannot because the Rohingya possess the same 
ethnic characteristics of the Bengali population as well as the language.  Both peoples are 
considered Indo-Aryan both ethnic-wise and linguistically.  Because of their shared ethnic 
identity and culture, it is impossible for people to argue that it is identity clashes that keep the 
Bangladeshi government from accepting Rohingya refugees.   
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HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 There has been extensive research on the subjects of security, national identity, ethnicity, 
and democratization as determining most of the immigration policy that states create.  What is 
lacking in analysis and consideration as a determinant to immigration law is domestic party 
politics, specifically in developing countries where democratic institutions, such as political 
parties, amount to little more than factions vying for control of the country.  Such is the case in 
Bangladesh.  While there are multiple political factions in the country, three dominate the 
political discourse in the state: the Awami League, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and Jamaat-
e-Islami.  The Awami League has confronted the Rohingya migrants with discriminatory 
policies.  As the ruling party, there have been repatriations conducted, documented by the United 
Nations, relocations to uninhabitable regions, criticized by human rights groups, and an 
unwillingness to recognize the Rohingya as refugees, per the official statements of the party 
leaders.6667  The Bangladesh National Party have expressed support for the Rohingya and call for 
the ruling Awami League to provide shelter to the minority group.68  In addition to voicing their 
support, the BNP is calling for the United Nations to issue a resolution condemning Myanmar for 
their treatment of the Rohingya and provide aid and resources to Bangladesh in order to provide 
shelter for the Rohingya in Bangladesh, something the Awami League has failed to 
accomplish.69  Jamaat-e-Islami has also expressed support for the Rohingya.  In a press release, 
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the party has urged the Bangladesh government to allow the Rohingya to enter the country on 
humanitarian grounds.70  In addition, the Islamist party has called for the following: 
…the UN, OIC, all international forums and organizations, human rights watchdogs and 
most particularly the Muslim countries and the peace loving people around the world to 
create pressure upon the Myanmar government to stop ongoing massacre and genocide, 
to take the Rohingya Muslims back in their home, to restore their citizenship and to 
ensure their all out safety.71 
 I believe it is the competition and individual ideologies of these groups that determine the 
treatment of the Rohingya migrants in Bangladesh.   
 What, then, can account for the differences in the parties that subsequently lead to the 
treatment of the migrants?  Why do some parties in Bangladesh discriminate against the 
Rohingya while others do not?  My hypotheses state there are two main variables, in the form of 
party policy, that lead to either their support for the minority group or animosity: their social 
values and political ideologies.  There are those that argue Bangladesh, like much of South Asia, 
is not equipped to handle large influxes of refugees because a strong civil society has not 
developed, the already high population density, and their absence from most international 
frameworks on refugee treatment.  Therefore, it is expected that the country would pursue 
restrictionist and exclusionary policies towards the migrants.  I will be able to control for these 
alternative explanations by highlighting the very different approaches each political party takes 
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towards Rohingya migrants, proving that there is variation when it comes to refugee policy in the 
country.   
My hypotheses are as follows: first, a party’s social values impact their policy towards 
the Rohingya migrants.  Second, a party’s political ideologies will impact their policy towards 
Rohingya migrants.  The party’s social values, in the form of a relationship with Islam will 
impact their stance on Rohingya migrants in the following way: the warmer a political party is 
towards Islam, the warmer their policy is towards the Rohingya. This can be explained in the 
following way: the Rohingya are a Muslim group, therefore, the more aligned with Islam a party 
is, the warmer their stance toward the Rohingya will be.  Jonathan Fox’s research corroborates 
this idea that the religion of the policy making group can affect the treatment of another group.  
He has found that when a minority group’s religion differs from that of a culturally similar 
majority, discriminatory policies can be expected to be enacted by the majority group.72  Over 
the past few decades, a substantial Rohingya diaspora has developed in Southeast Bangladesh, 
establishing cultural bonds between the people of the two countries.   
Finally, I believe that the political ideologies of each party, which can be measured by 
their nationalistic bent and position on democratic government, will influence their stance on 
Rohingya migrants in the following ways: I expect that the more nationalistic a party, the more 
receptive a party will be of Rohingya migrants.  I expect that the warmer a party is towards 
democracy, the warmer a party will be towards Rohingya migrants.  I also include two 
complimentary variables to a party’s political ideologies: foreign policy will compliment a 
party’s nationalistic bent and economic policy will compliment a party’s democratic bent.   
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 Normally, as a nationalistic party, immigrants and refugees would be seen as unwanted 
and muddying the national homogeneity of the country.  In the context of Bangladesh, however, 
a country’s nationalistic bent plays a backseat role to the factor of party competition.  For 
example, the BNP is a nationalistic party, but opposes the liberal and global oriented Awami 
League who pursues discriminatory policies against the Rohingya.  Therefore, the BNP, while 
nationalistic, adopts accommodationist policies towards the Rohingya, for the purpose of 
standing against the Awami League’s restrictions policies.  The BNP also represents the identity 
of the Bangladeshi people, which in years since independence, has meant ethno-religious 
identification.  Belonging to the same religion and sharing the same ethnic qualities, the 
Rohingya are a part of the “nation” that the BNP purports to represent the interests of. 
Foreign policy goes hand-in-hand with nationalism.  This can be explained in the 
following way: Prime Minister Modi in India, through his “Act East Policy” has sought to 
strengthen ties, both economic and militarily with ASEAN nations, most notably 
Myanmar.73  Because of this policy goal, Prime Minister Modi has been skeptical of the reports 
accusing Myanmar of sponsoring violence against the Rohingya in the Rakhine State, preferring 
to allow Myanmar to solve the problem internally.  India views the Rohingya crisis as 
Myanmar’s problem, not the surrounding states.  Naturally, any political ally of India would 
adopt a similar stance.  As far as Pakistan, Mylonas’ theory that an external power can affect a 
host state’s policy towards a migrant group comes into play.  His theory states that the if the 
external power, Pakistan in this case, is an adversary of the host state, Bangladesh, and supports 
the immigrant group, then the host state will adopt restrictionist policies towards that immigrant 
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group, the Rohingya in this case.74  Mylonas’ theory holds true, conversely, in that parties that 
are pro-Pakistan have a much warmer attitude toward Rohingya migrants.    
Bangladesh has a unitary system of governance with a Westminster-styled parliamentary 
government.  There are 350 seats to be filled by parliament members elected in different districts 
using by a plurality of votes.  Elections are scheduled to happen every five years, but turmoil and 
violence often delay the voting process.  In the latest election in 2014, there was only a 22% 
voter turnout as the BNP-led opposition boycotted the election.75  The Prime Minster is the head 
of government and the cabinet.  The President is the head of state, but the office has largely been 
reduced to a ceremonial role.  As Gary Freeman points out, democratic states are more likely to 
adopt liberal and inclusionary policies towards immigrants.   The policy makers in Bangladesh, 
according to Freeman, are vote maximizers that seek to please organized interest groups that 
favor immigration, rather than the general public who will be less excited about the prospect of 
immigrant inclusion.76    
This can also explain why parties who favor a free and private economy would have a 
warm stance towards Rohingya: a liberal democracy means a free economy that has business 
interests that inclusionary immigration policies would be conducive to.  Those business interests 
will prove strong organized groups that can influence policy makers.   
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Table 1: Independent Variables and Hypothesized Relationship with Dependent Variable 
Political Ideologies Variables  
Nationalism Parties that have a nationalistic bent will have a warmer stance on 
Rohingya migrants. 
Democracy  Parties that have a democratic bent will have a warmer stance on 
Rohingya migrants. 
Social Values Variables 
Relationship with 
Islam 
Parties with a warmer relationship with Islam will have a warmer stance 
on Rohingya migrants. 
 
Table 2: Independent Variables Values 
Independent variables Independent variable values 
Social Values Pro-Islam or Secular 
Political Ideologies  Nationalistic or Not nationalistic 
Democratic or Not democratic 
 
Table 3: Parties and Respective Independent Variable Values 
Party Variable value 
Social Policy Variables 
Awami League Secular 
BNP Pro-Islam 
Jamaat-e-Islami Pro-Islam 
Political Ideology Variables 
Awami League Not nationalistic 
Not democratic  
BNP Nationalistic 
Democratic 
Jamaat-e-Islami Not nationalistic 
Democratic  
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AWAMI LEAGUE 
Awami League Social Values 
 Because Bangladesh is a majority Muslim state, each major political party in the country 
is forced to hold a stance on the religion.  While Bangladesh was founded as a secular state, both 
civilian and military, secular and non-secular in their political platforms, governments have 
moved away from that idea, recognizing Bangladesh as a Muslim-majority state.77  For the 
purposes of this study and because of the reason just mentioned, I will use each party’s specific 
party platform on Islam to operationalize their social values.  According to my hypothesis, if the 
political party in question has a warm relationship with Islam, their attitude towards the 
Rohingya will be positive, and the opposite will be true if they are more secular.  This study will 
consider a relationship with Islam “warm” if the party recognizes it as the state religion, and 
“cold” if they do not.   
 First, I will look at the Awami League’s relationship with Islam.  According to most 
scholars and historians, Bangladesh was founded as a secular nation, attempting to distance itself 
with the more Islamic-oriented Pakistan.  As the first governing party in the state’s history, the 
Awami League has always maintained itself as a secular and moderate party compared with the 
BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, its main competitors.  According to the party’s constitution, 
secularism is one of its fundamental principles.78  Despite the Awami League’s official stance on 
religion, many of its members and supporters do practice Islam.  However, because they do not 
recognize it as the state religion, those opposed to the Awami League accuse it of being actively 
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anti-Islam.  While this is not true, the Awami League has taken steps that Bengalis may view as 
opposed to Islam, such as the ICT set up by the party to prosecute members of Jamaat-e-Islami.  
Many of the mem convicted were prominent Islamic scholars and leaders, active in the Muslim 
community in Bangladesh.79 
 Due to the Awami Leagues secular relationship with Islam, they are less interested in 
helping the Rohingya than the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, who have an incentive to help the 
migrants as they share a similar religious identity.  The Rohingya are a Muslim minority 
concentrated in the West of Myanmar, a majority Buddhist country.  The largest rationale behind 
the violence against the Rohingya in the Rakhine state has, therefore, been sectarian.  This 
religiously fueled violence has rallied the Muslim world in support of the Rohingya, including 
the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami.8081  The Rohingya have not seen the same support from the 
Awami League due to the fact they have no sectarian ally in the party.  In addition, the Awami 
League has reason to suppress the migrants in Bangladesh as they pose an electoral threat to the 
party.  The Rohingya are concentrated in areas that are BNP and Jamaat strongholds.  With the 
sectarian support the BNP and Jamaat can provide, the Rohingya see them as their dog in the 
political fight.  As the Awami League tightens their grip on control of the country, it would serve 
their best interest to strip the Rohingya of any means to support their opposition electorally.82 
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Awami League Political Ideologies 
Finally, I will discuss the Awami League’s political ideologies’ effect on their policies 
concerning the Rohingya migrants.  According to my hypothesis, the political ideology variable 
is operationalized as a party’s sense of nationalism and whether or not the party has been a 
defender of democracy in Bangladesh.  I have posited that the relationship between the variables 
mentioned and a party’s attitude towards Rohingya migrants will be as follows: if a party is 
nationalistic, they will have a warmer stance on Rohingya migrants; if a party is a defender of 
democracy, they will have a warmer stance on Rohingya migrants.  I have also included 
complimentary variables that will help further explain the links between political ideologies and 
migrant attitude.  As a compliment to nationalism, a party’s foreign policy has proven to be 
important to consider when gauging their treatment of the Rohingya migrants.  I posit that when 
a party eschews nationalistic rhetoric and implements policy of that nature, they tend to be more 
pro-Pakistan as well as opposed to India.  Also, as a complimentary variable to a party’s 
democratic bent, I posit that when a party is a proponent of liberal democracy, they will also 
follow suit in their economic policies, favoring a less regulated market.  When a party has a more 
restrictive view of the democratic process and free elections, they will favor a more regulated, 
welfare-based economy. 
Awami League Nationalism 
Due to the fact that Bangladesh was born out of a war of liberation from Pakistan, a 
current of nationalism has run through the country since its inception in 1971.  The Awami 
League has been no exception to that patriotism.  However, since regaining power in 2009, the 
party has had to counter the nationalism of BNP with its own brand of globalism in an effort to 
open up Bangladesh to the rest of the world.  This is illustrated by Bangladesh’s recent outreach 
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into regional connectivity under the leadership of the Awami League, and, most importantly, its 
willingness to work with India, one of the world’s largest economies.  Under the leadership of 
the Awami League, Bangladesh has maintained its member status in the Bay of Bengal Initiative 
for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), a regional international 
organization designed to foster technological and economic cooperation among Bay of Bengal 
states.  The Awami League also oversaw the opening of the BIMSTEC Permanent Secretariat in 
Bangladesh’s capital, Dhaka.83  Additionally, the ruling Awami League has been accused of 
maintaining trade relationships with India that are unfavorable to Bangladesh, an accusation 
corroborated by the Awami League’s overtures since regaining power in 2009.84  
It is because, in part, of the Awami League’s globalist ideologies that they have pursued 
discriminatory policies against the Rohingya migrants in Bangladesh.  The globally-minded 
politics and regionally deal making of the Awami League has opened the Bangladesh 
government and their decision making up to the influences of other states, leading to the policies 
they have implemented against the Rohingya migrants.  This is most notable in the party’s 
growing affinity for Prime Minister Modi’s India.  The burgeoning partnership between 
Bangladesh and India means an aligning of values and goals.  Modi’s “Act East” plan that seeks 
to kindle a relationship with ASEAN nations pulls Bangladesh into the alliance, also.  Because 
Modi has expressed the opinion that Myanmar has the sole responsibility to handle the Rohingya 
crisis, the Awami League has taken the same position in the form of repatriations and the 
elimination of pull factors in East Bangladesh.  As mentioned earlier, the BIMSTEC regional 
organization also joins Bangladesh and Myanmar.  It would be in the best interest for Bangladesh 
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to keep itself from chastising Myanmar, also a member state, or caring for their ethnic cleansing 
refugees.  Rather, the Awami League has widely chosen to allow Myanmar to handle it internally 
and minimize the amount of Rohingya migrants in Bangladesh. 
Awami League Foreign Policy 
Currently the ruling party in Bangladesh, the Awami League is the prime example of a 
political party in Bangladesh that has pursued discriminatory policies against the Rohingya 
migrants.  Led by Prime Minister Hasina, I posit that this is due to their values and ideologies as 
a political party, specifically their foreign policy, social values, and political ideology.  First, I 
will discuss their foreign policy as having a causal relationship with their treatment of Rohingya 
migrants.  Namely, the party’s diplomatic ties with India and Pakistan, two states that have a rich 
and complex history with Bangladesh and serve as some of the largest wedges between the 
parties I will discuss.  I hypothesize that if a party takes a pro-India stance, they will be more 
likely to pursue discriminatory policies against Rohingya migrants, where the opposite will be 
true if a party does not take a pro-India stance. 
 Since Bangladesh’s inception after the Liberation War in 1971, the Awami League has 
always viewed India as a friend.  This is due in large part to India’s intervention on the side of 
the Bangladesh independence movement during the war, led by the Awami League.  Indian-
Awami relations were once again rekindled during the 2014 election in Bangladesh that saw 
India play a large role in their support for the Awami League.  According to Kumar, “There was 
a widespread perception that India had openly supported the Awami League’s continuation in 
power.”85  This has involved barring other political parties from participating in elections and 
creating controversial tribunals to punish those who the Awami League deem committed war 
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crimes on the side of Pakistan during the Liberation War, many of whom were leaders of Jamaat-
e-Islami.86 
 Much of the mutual goodwill between the Awami League and India can be attributed to 
their shared history with Pakistan.  As the leaders of the independence movement during the 
Liberation War, the Awami League has historically viewed Pakistan as an adversary.  This is 
further illustrated by the war crimes tribunal created by the Awami League to prosecute 
individuals seen as supporting Pakistan during the civil war.  In 2012, The International Crimes 
Tribunal (ICT) began convicting those deemed as having committed war crimes during the 
conflict.  Very prominent members of Jamaat-e-Islami and BNP were convicted by the court, 
including former leaders of Jamaat, Ghulam Azam and Motiur Rahman Nizami.  The courts 
methods, however, have been called deeply flawed and problematic with direct government 
intervention on the side of the prosecution.87  The court also reopened old wounds between the 
two countries that both sides have worked to close over the decades since the conflict ended.88  
Those convicted were mostly comprised of opposition party members and Islamic scholars who 
supported an undivided Pakistan at the time of the Liberation War.   
 As stated, it is my hypothesis that a party with a pro-India stance will pursue 
discriminatory policies against Rohingya migrants.  This holds true for the Awami League in that 
their historical friendship with India is directly influencing their harsh attitudes towards the 
Rohingya coming out of Myanmar.  This is illustrated by Indian Prime Minister Modi’s “Act 
East Policy” that has sought to strengthen ties, both economic and militarily with ASEAN 
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nations, most notably Myanmar.89  Because of this policy goal, Prime Minister Modi has been 
skeptical of the reports accusing Myanmar of sponsoring violence against the Rohingya in the 
Rakhine State, preferring to allow Myanmar to solve the problem internally.  India views the 
Rohingya crisis as Myanmar’s problem, not the surrounding states.  Naturally, any political ally 
of India would adopt a similar stance, in this case, the Awami League in Bangladesh.  In an 
effort to court India and Modi, the Awami League has confronted the Rohingya migrants with 
discriminatory policies.  As the ruling party, there have been repatriations conducted, 
documented by the United Nations, relocations to uninhabitable regions, criticized by human 
rights groups, and an unwillingness to recognize the Rohingya as refugees.9091   
My hypothesis also states that a party that does not have a pro-Pakistan stance will pursue 
discriminatory policies against the Rohingya.  This holds true in the case of the Awami League.  
Illustrated by the problematic war crimes tribunal, the party’s warm relationship with India, and 
the opposite sides the Awami League and Pakistan took during the Liberation War, Bangladesh 
has exhibited a cold relationship with Pakistan.  My hypothesized relationship between the 
Awami League’s view of Pakistan and their attitude toward the Rohingya can summarized by 
Harris Mylonas’ theory on the link between a host state’s foreign policy and a foreign group of 
people.  Mylonas posits that when a host state encounters an enemy-supported group, the ruling 
political elites will not accommodate this group.  This is because the host state may interpret the 
foreign group as a future fifth column for the adversary state.92  This has been seen in 
Bangladesh where the ruling Awami League has refused to accommodate and assimilate the 
Rohingya migrants.   
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Awami League Democracy 
One of the largest criticisms of the Awami League has been their aggressive 
consolidation of power by highly undemocratic means.  In the run-up to the 2014 national 
elections, the party cracked down on the opposing BNP and placed their leader, Khaleda Zia, 
under house arrest, all but ensuring the Awami League would run unopposed in the election.  
One of many bodies and states criticizing the election, the UN’s Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
called the vote neither peaceful nor inclusive.93  In response to the flawed elections, BNP leader 
Zia called the Awami League-led government both autocratic and illegal.  She also called for the 
immediate abdication of the leadership by the Awami League.94  Freeman’s theory can also be 
used to identify the relationship between the Awami League’s strained relationship with 
democracy and their policy towards the Rohingya migrants.   
According to Freeman, parties in liberal, democratic states are vote-maximizers that seek 
to please organized interest groups that favor immigration, rather than the general public who 
will be less excited about the prospect of immigrant inclusion.95  Illustrated by the election 
turmoil in 2014, the Awami League is less concerned with maximizing votes than undermining 
the democratic process to their advantage.  When a party removes all opposition, there is less 
competition for votes, making the need to satisfy any type of base less important.  The possible 
base, in this case, being Rohingya migrants and their supporters. 
Awami League Economic Policy 
 One of the founding principles of the Awami League in Bangladesh was democratic 
socialism, an economic ideology envisioned by the party, but one that has yet to surface in the 
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poverty-stricken country.  While the economy has shown steady signs of improving, there have 
been consistent labor disputes and hostile worker-owner relations in the garment industry that 
takes the lion’s share of the country’s economy.96  Despite this, the Awami League maintains in 
its “Vision 2021” political manifesto that by the nation’s 50th anniversary, Bangladesh will be a 
middle-income nation with marked by economic development and initiative, including the 
alleviation of poverty, the meeting of basic needs, and a robust healthcare, housing, and 
education sector.97 
 The restrictionist immigration policies directed at the Rohingya by the Awami League 
can also be linked to their “Vision 2021” political manifesto.  In an effort to reach the goals laid 
out in the plan, a high degree of economic control is required.  This runs anathema to the liberal 
economy envisioned by parties like the BNP.  According to Gary Freeman’s theory on 
immigration policy and economics, an increase in immigration is conducive to a classically 
liberal economy, rather than a welfare state.98  Therefore, the social democratic goals enshrined 
in the party’s founding constitution and the necessary reforms needed to reach their 2021 goal, 
the restriction of Rohingya into Bangladesh is in the Awami League’s best interest.  In order to 
alleviate the poverty of the country and bolster the healthcare and education system, the 
introduction of hundreds of thousands of additional potential citizens cannot be accepted.  Too 
large of a strain will be put on the social institutions the Awami League wishes to implement. 
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THE BANGLADESH NATIONALIST PARTY 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party Social Values 
 As mentioned, the BNP differentiated itself from the Awami League in Bangladesh’s first 
years by adopting a Muslim-centric stance.  They did not see the new country as a secular state 
to stand apart from Pakistan, but a nation of Muslims that should embrace its common religious 
identity and reach out to the broader Muslim world.  This adoption of Bangladeshi nationalism 
based on Islam was the motive first used by party founder General Zia-ur-Rahman that laid the 
foundation for the military leadership of General Hussein Muhammad Ershad during the 
1980’s.99  This Islamic nationalism continues into the current BNP party leadership.  Rahman’s 
daughter, Khaleda Zia, the current leader of the BNP, has developed a partnership with Jamaat-e-
Islami leaders based on their shared Islamic values.  While Jamaat-e-Islami prefers a Bangladesh 
under fundamental, Islamist Sharia Law, the two parties have united in their opposition to the 
Awami League.100 
 According to my thesis, the warmer a political party is to Islam, the warmer they will act 
towards to Rohingya migrants.  This can be explained, largely, by the work of Jonathan Fox.  He 
posits that the policy making body’s religious makeup has a direct relationship with the policies 
that that body imposes.  If the body in question, in this case the BNP, shares the same religion 
with the group in question, the Rohingya, there will be less discrimination within the policies.101  
The Rohingya also serve the BNP electorally.  Along with the calls for rights for the migrants, 
the BNP is a staunch supporter of free elections in Bangladesh.  Being vote-maximizers, the 
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BNP will benefit from the religious ties the party shares with the Rohingya.  To understand the 
support the Rohingya have for the BNP and vice versa, it is important to understand the 
ethnolinguistic similarities between Bengalis and Rohingya.  They are both Indo-Aryan peoples 
that share language similarities native to South.  As a party founded on Bengali self-
determination and national pride, it is natural for the BNP and the Rohingya to have an affinity 
for one another, as they share largely the same ethnicity, language, and religious characteristics.  
The BNP has proven the above theses in their policies concerning the Rohingya.  Sharing an 
ethnic and Muslim identity, the BNP, in its opposition, has called for the Awami League to end 
their discrimination against the group and give them the rights that they are entitled to as 
refugees.  
Bangladesh Nationalist Party Political Ideologies 
As the final variable I will discuss pertaining to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, I 
hypothesize that the BNP’s stances on democracy and nationalism, as components of their whole 
political ideology, will inform their policies concerning the Rohingya.  I will also include the 
complimentary values of foreign policy as a compliment to the party’s stance on nationalism, 
and economic policy as a compliment to the party’s stance on the role of liberal democracy.   
Bangladesh Nationalist Party Nationalism 
 The Bangladesh Nationalist Party is inherently a nationalistic party.  Before Bangladesh’s 
inception, the BNP’s founder was a leader in the Liberation War with Pakistan, even reading the 
official declaration of independence from Pakistan from a captured radio station in 
Chittagong.102  It is this strong sense of nationalism that has informed the party’s policies from 
the beginning.  Zia sought to separate itself from the Awami League’s pro-India stance, create a 
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Bangladeshi identity based on Islam, and strengthen the nation economically through self-
sufficiency.103  These policies are enshrined in a 19-point program that serves as the party’s 
founding manifesto.  According to that founding document, "The sovereignty and independence 
of Bangladesh, golden fruits of the historic liberation struggle, is our sacred trust and inviolable 
right."104  
That nationalism plays a role in a party’s attitude towards Rohingya migrants is also 
central to my thesis.  I posit that the more nationalistically minded a party is, the more likely they 
will pursue inclusionary policies concerning the migrants.  Normally this would not be true as 
nationalism is a tried and true insulation from migrant acceptance.  However, this holds true in 
the case of the BNP for two reasons.  Firstly, the BNP is the largest opposition party to the ruling 
Awami League that has pursued globalist policies and is seen by many Bangladeshi nationals as 
having to close of a relationship to India at the expense of Bangladeshi interests.  More 
importantly, the ruling party has pursued exclusionary policies against the Rohingya migrants.  
To prove their opposition mettle, the BNP has expressed support for the Rohingya migrants.  
Secondly, the BNP has formed a Bangladeshi nationalism based not on linguistic similarities, but 
religious and sectarian overlaps, namely Islam.  As the Rohingya migrants are a Muslim 
minority, the BNP is more than willing to incorporate them into the Bangladeshi sphere to 
strengthen their ranks both electorally and ideologically with the hundreds of thousands that are 
taking shelter in Bangladesh. 
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Bangladesh Nationalist Party Foreign Policy 
 The main opposition party in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party has been a 
strident supporter of the Rohingya.  According to my hypothesis, this is due to a combination of 
two factors: their social values and political ideologies.  As I did with the Awami League, I will 
discuss each area of policy and provide an analysis that explains that policy with their attitude 
toward the Rohingya migrants.  First, I will cover the BNP’s foreign policy, specifiacally their 
relationship and stance with and towards India and Pakistan, Bangladesh’s most formidable 
diplomatic partners.   
 As mentioned earlier, political parties in Bangladesh are largely defined by their 
relationship with India, the superpower in South Asia.  As Bangladesh’s most nationalistic party, 
the relationship between the BNP and India is inherently one of tension.  The party’s animosity 
towards India goes back to the inception of Bangladesh soon after the Liberation War.  Initially, 
India and Bangladesh enjoyed a period of friendship and mutual respect after the war, united by 
their mutual animosity towards Pakistan.  Tides turned, however, when in 1975, General Zia-ur-
Rahman of the newly formed BNP assumed power in Bangladesh.  Rahman moved away from 
the purely linguistic nationalism in the country to one based on Islam, alienating the new country 
from its Indian allies.  India’s attempted cultural overtures to Bangladesh in order to resume 
good relations backfired when the BNP perceived the good intentions as an Indian affront to the 
new-found Bangladeshi nationalism.  Rahman and his BNP viewed India as seeking to dilute the 
hard-earned Bangladeshi nationalism with their own culture.  As with most other South Asian 
countries, Bangladesh, under the control of the BNP, also became wary of India’s growing 
influence in the region.  Being an anti-India party was a quick way to prove the party’s 
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nationalist credentials.105  That animosity towards India still serves as the party’s mission 
statement today.  The BNP, while not in power after boycotting the 2014 elections in 
Bangladesh, regularly condemns the Awami League for their close ties with Modi’s India.106 
 In addition to its relationship with India, the policy positions the BNP takes against 
Pakistan is also vital to understanding the foreign policy of the party.  Despite the BNP’s 
reputation as a nationalistic party, it understands the cultural similarities that Bangladesh and 
Pakistan share, namely Islam as the dominant religion.  Attempts were made to reconcile the two 
nations under the BNP’s leadership in the years following the war.  With Rahman emphasizing 
the importance of religion, an effort was made to normalize relations between the former 
enemies.  Ties were also strengthened in order to bolster a mutual stance against India as a 
growing hegemonic threat in the region.  This friendship between the BNP and Pakistan has been 
maintained today by the BNP’s current leader Khaleda Zia.  The relationship today, however, 
has turned more sinister with India accusing the BNP of aiding Pakistani intelligence in their 
campaign against India.107  Nevertheless, the friendly relationship with Pakistan has been a 
hallmark policy of the BNP in Bangladeshi politics. 
 So how have the relationships with India and Pakistan affected the BNP’s attitude 
towards the Rohingya migrants in Bangladesh?  Much like the underlying justification of their 
diplomatic ties with India and Pakistan, it has to do with the party’s nationalistic goals.  The 
BNP has carefully cultivated a Bangladeshi nationalism rooted in religious identity, namely 
Islam.  This has pitted the party against India, a largely Hindu nation, and united it with Pakistan, 
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a country that shares a common religious identity.  The Rohingya are a Muslim minority 
escaping ethnic cleansing in their native Myanmar.  They have garnered support from most 
major Muslim states, including, most importantly, Pakistan.108  Over the years, after the 
successive Rohingya persecutions in Myanmar, a sizable diaspora of 300,000 of the minority has 
established itself in Karachi, raising money for the refugees currently fleeing Myanmar.109  The 
sectarian Pakistani support is also shared by the BNP, leading to the BNP’s support of the 
Rohingya’s plight, also.  That the Rohingya support will add to the BNP’s power as a political 
force in Bangladesh and against India also informs the party’s attitude toward the migrant group.  
As mentioned earlier, Prime Minister Modi’s “Act East” policy has influenced his stance that the 
Rohingya crisis is one that needs to be solved internally by Myanmar.  In order to counter this, 
the BNP has made a point to criticize the Awami League for supporting this position.110 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party Democracy 
First, I will cover the BNP’s stance on democracy over their years as a political force in 
Bangladesh.  The Bangladesh Nationalist Party was one of the first proponents and implementers 
of liberal democracy in Bangladesh.  After a series of coups that displaced the Awami League 
leadership in the early 1970’s, after the creation of the independent state, General Zia-ur-Rahman 
rose to power and created the Bangladesh Nationalist Party.  As a key figure in the Liberation 
War, General Zia was bolstered by his Bangladesh nationalism, his belief that Islam is the 
religion of Bangladesh, and, most importantly, his dedication to moving Bangladesh in the 
direction of liberal democracy.   Upon becoming President in 1977, he began transitioning 
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leadership positions from the military to civilians, illustrated by his barring of military colleagues 
from holding cabinet and military positions.111  In 1978, Zia announced that there would be 
elections held to “pave the way for democracy”.  In addition, he lifted the previous ban on 
political parties and intimated his intention to amend the constitution to allow for independent 
judiciary as well as a "sovereign parliament."112 
 Today, under the leadership of Zia’s widow, Begum Khaleda Zia, the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party has continued Zia’s vision of democracy in Bangladesh.  Throughout the 
1980’s, as Bangladesh was controlled by the Ershad military regime, the BNP refused to 
participate in government as they saw the regime illegitimate.113  It was Ershad who was behind 
the assignation of Zia, ending the slow progression towards democracy.  Under the current 
Awami League rule, the BNP finds itself again barred from government by a highly 
undemocratic party.  It is from this position that the BNP has called for the implementation of a 
caretaker government to oversee free and fair elections.114   
According to my hypothesis, the warmer a party is to democracy, the warmer their stance 
will be on the Rohingya migrants.  This is true in the case of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
since the influx of the minority group in the past five years.  As proponents of democracy, the 
BNP supports the assimilation and normalization of the Rohingya minority, as they are a vote-
maximizing entity.   Going back to the theory of Gary Freeman, the BNP would benefit from the 
Rohingya electorally if they were able to participate in elections.  It is this prospect of votes that 
will return the party to power that plays a part in driving their policies towards the migrants.   
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Bangladesh Nationalist Party Economics 
  Economics also plays a sizable role in the formation of political ideology for the BNP.  
Part of the 19-point program previously mentioned, economic self-sufficiency is integral to the 
Bangladeshi people, according to the BNP.  As opposed to the Awami League, which sees itself 
as the center-left party, the BNP is firmly in the center-right with their nationalistic tendencies 
and their classically economic ideals.  From the beginning of the party, an economy based on 
Bangladeshi nationalism was their goal.  With that vision in mind, Zia set out to emphasize a 
market that as decentralized, free, and focused on agriculture and industry.  To that end, the 
leader traveled the Bangladeshi countryside to encourage rural farmers to produce more foods 
and grains to meet the demands of the self-sufficiency ideal.  While creating multiple programs 
to bolster rural development, including the Bangladesh Jute and Rice research institutes, he also 
moved to de-collectivize farms to promote the private sector and increase exports.  In his 
liberalization pursuit, Zia and the BNP were able to reduce quotas and restrictions on agriculture 
and industrial activities.115   
The economics of the BNP plays a large role in their acceptance of migrants, also.  The 
decentralized, private economy that the BNP envisions is conducive to the integrations of the 
Rohingya in the following way: according to Freeman’s theory, the liberal democracy that grants 
its economy a high degree of liberalism will have business interests that will benefit from the 
inclusionary immigration policies, as that means more labor at a cheaper cost.  This holds 
especially true in Bangladesh where unskilled labor makes up the lion’s share of the labor force 
in the country.116 
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JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI 
Jamaat-e-Islami Social Values 
 Jamaat-e-Islami’s social values inform all of their subsequent values and policies.  Jamaat 
was founded as a political movement that seeks to transform society into an Islamic state through 
modern revolutionary means.  This involves a revisionist method that aims to replace the leaders 
of a current, secular state with those that will work to transform the state into one based on 
Islamic values and Sharia law.  Jamaat works within the contemporary democratic framework of 
a country to achieve their ultimate goals.   Because of these goals, the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-
Islami hold very strong pro-Islamic values.   
 According to Maidul Islam, the rise of Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh can largely be 
attributed to the failure of a secular-nationalist state that was created when Bangladesh achieved 
independence.117  The government following the creation of the state failed to address and 
eradicate the extreme poverty and man-made famine that afflicted the Bangladeshi people in the 
early years of the state.  Under pressure to solve the nation’s problems, the leader at the time, the 
Awami League’s Mujib, resorted to repressive measures that meant the banning of political 
parties and the concentration of power in the executive branch, rendering Mujib as the absolute 
ruler of Bangladesh.118  This fermented the Jamaat movement in Bangladesh and, as a result, 
when the party was reinstated by Zia through the BNP, Jamaat regained power built upon the 
Muslim identity of Bangladesh revived by the BNP and Zia.  
 Today, the party again finds itself barred from participating in elections by the ruling 
Awami League, without a ruler (executed by the Awami League) and partnering with the BNP to 
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oppose the current leadership in Bangladesh.  As an Islamist revisionist party, Jamaat relies upon 
the polls to regain power and diffuse their idea of an Islamic state.  The region in which most of 
the Rohingya migrants reside has historically been an electoral stronghold by Jamaat.119  The 
massive influx of Rohingya could mean a huge number of voters for the Jamaat party if they are 
granted voting rights in Bangladesh.  Bur first, Jamaat must prove to the Rohingya that they 
support their cause and share the same religious identity.  It is the mutual trust based on religion 
that plays a vital role in Jamaat’s vocal support for the Rohingya in both Myanmar, but more 
importantly, Bangladesh. 
Jamaat-e-Islami Political Ideologies 
 The final variable that I will discuss pertaining to Jamaat-e-Islami is their political 
ideology in the form of their stance on democracy and nationalism, with the complimentary 
values of foreign policy (for nationalism) and economic policy (for democracy).  As a primarily 
religious party, the exact policies regarding each arena of domestic politics as a predictor of their 
attitude toward the Rohingya is a little murky.  Their religiosity has a much better direction of 
causation.  Despite this, it is important to understand their worldly ideologies as they contribute 
to the logistics of Rohingya assistance. 
Jamaat-e-Islami Nationalism 
As mentioned, I hypothesize that the more nationalistically minded a political party is, 
the warmer it will be toward Rohingya migrants.  The Bangladesh Jamaat party is not 
nationalistic in the conventional sense of the term.  In fact, Maududi was a staunch critic of 
nationalism as he sought to unite the Muslim world along the lines of Islam, not any nation.120  
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As a religious-political movement, the party is inherently un-nationalistic in the sense that they 
see nation-states incompatible with Islam, hence Maududi’s indifference, if not opposition, to the 
creation of Pakistan as a home for Indian Muslims.  When it comes to the Bangladesh Jamaat, 
the party, then the Pakistan Jamaat, was opposed to the creation of the independent state of 
Bangladesh.  Today, the party works within the confines of the Bangladeshi state and recognizes 
it as such, but still holds a favorable relationship with Pakistan, highlighting the party’s lack of 
Bangladeshi nationalism.   
 The relationship between Jamaat and the BNP is key to understanding how the party’s 
nationalism, or lack of it, informs their attitude toward Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.  While 
Jamaat expresses a lack of national pride in their politics, their main and crucial political ally, the 
BNP, does.  It is for this reason that we see Jamaat voicing support for the Rohingya migrants.  
The Rohingya provide a bolster for the BNP’s nationalist leanings, helping the party toward their 
goal of returning to power in Bangladesh.  Because the BNP has a chance of returning to the 
Bangladeshi parliament, their coalition partner, Jamaat, will likely return with them. 
Jamaat-e-Islami Foreign Policy 
 Despite being shut out from Bangladeshi politics for much of the party’s existence, 
Jamaat-e-Islami still serves as a powerful actor in the country’s politics.  As the most noteworthy 
and impactful Islamist party in Bangladesh, Jamaat has voiced their support for the Rohingya 
migrants that are taking shelter in the state.  As with the other two parties I have discussed, I will 
cover Jamaat policies concerning foreign policy, social values, and their political ideologies and 
how they, in turn, influence their stance on the Rohingya migrants.  Maidul Islam’s Limits of 
Islamism: Jamaat-e-Islami in Contemporary India and Bangladesh provides perhaps the most 
comprehensive information on the Jamaat-e-Islami movement as a political force in Bangladesh, 
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giving an in-depth look at the party as a political entity rather than a radical religious movement, 
as most other researchers have.  In discussing Jamaat, I will use primarily his work as a source 
for information 
 According to the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami movement, Syed Ab’ul Ala Maududi, 
the party is based in Islamism.  Therefore, any sense of nationalism or deep recognition of any 
state that is not an Islamic state is insidious and inherently un-Islamic.121  However, as a political 
movement, the Bangladesh Jamaat is forced to take a side when it comes to foreign policy 
concerning India and Pakistan.  Even Maududi, who opposed the creation of Pakistan, 
understood the need to play the game of politics to advance his ideals of Islam.  Furthermore, 
because the party experienced the most pivotal moments of its history in each country, Jamaat in 
Bangladesh, out of political necessity, takes a policy position on India and Pakistan.   
While in a coalition government with the BNP during the mid-2000’s, Jamaat and the 
BNP shared a similar stance towards India, one that was cold.  According to a Jamaat 
intellectual, India has always exploited Bangladesh regarding trade and water rights.122  
Moreover, according to another intellectual, the anti-Indian sentiment, or rather the cold Indian 
relationship he describes it as, originates from the Indian hostility towards Jamaat, not from 
Jamaat itself.123  This animosity directed at Jamaat stems from the support the group lent 
Pakistan during the Liberation War.  Therefore, the feelings between Jamaat and India are 
largely derived from the geo-political history of the Indian subcontinent, not contemporary 
politics or ideology.  However, it can be said that Jamaat, because of its alliance with the BNP, 
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takes its stance against India purely to oppose the Awami League, which they, along with the 
BNP accuse of being outwardly pro-Indian. 
The Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami has an integral relationship with Pakistan that goes back 
to the movement’s roots.  During the Liberation War, Jamaat supported a united Pakistan.  
Because the main motivation behind the secession from Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh 
was one of ethno-linguistic nationalism, largely fostered by the Awami League and, initially the 
BNP, the Jamaat-e-Islami chapter in Pakistan opposed it, rightly claiming the justification was 
one of secular, not Islamic, nature.  This was inherently contradictory to the movement’s 
founding principle of creating a state based wholly on Islam.  Additionally, after the war and 
Bangladesh’s independence, Jamaat lived in exile in Pakistan until the ban on the party was lifted 
by Zia, then leader of Bangladesh through the BNP.  Today, Jamaat again finds itself barred 
from participating in government by the ruling Awami League, using the Jamaat’s support of 
Pakistan as its primary justification of the ban.124 
 Jamaat-e-Islami has been a vocal supporter of the Rohinga in Bangladesh.125  While it is 
easy to chalk this up to pure sectarian commonalities, Jamaat’s foreign policy also plays a role in 
the decision, too.  As mentioned before, India has been a staunch advocate for Myanmar after the 
implementation of Prime Minister Modi’s “Act East” policy.  In an effort to court Modi, the 
Awami League has gotten on board with the policy, taking pressure off Myanmar to solve the 
crisis.  Due to the animosity that the Awami League and India has shown Jamaat, it is natural 
that the party announce a policy that would counter India’s and the Awami League’s on the 
Rohingya.   
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 Jamaat’s relationship with Pakistan is vital to understanding their position on the 
Rohingya migrants.  Being a party that has very close ties with the northern neighbor of 
Bangladesh, Jamaat also represents Pakistan’s interests in Bangladesh, which are largely 
religious.  This sectarian bond between the Bangladesh Jamaat and Pakistan is one of the driving 
forces that is compelling the party to take positive action on behalf of the minority group.  Like 
much of the Muslim world, Pakistan has called for support of the Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar, 
and for the safety of the migrants in other countries. Pakistan’s support can be attributed to the 
common religion that the country shares with the Bangladesh Rohingya and the large Rohingya 
refugee population that has established a sizeable diaspora in Pakistan. 126  These combining 
factors drive the support of Jamaat in Bangladesh for the Rohingya. 
Jamaat-e-Islami Democracy 
First, I will cover Jamaat’s stance on democracy.  As an Islamist party, many believe that 
the party pursues methods of governing that follow Islamic law: a theocracy that lacks free and 
fair elections that are hallmarks of liberal democracy.  However, once the party succeeds in 
transforming the state into one that practices Islamic law, the Islamic state would follow the 
democratic and republican values of the caliphate.127  Additionally, the party was specifically 
designed to work within the conventional democratic state.    In the pre-partition years, Jamaat-e-
Islami was created as an effort to transform India into a modern Islamic state, not by any violent 
revolution, but through revisionism.  Maududi sought to transform society from the top down: 
beginning with the leaders who will, in turn, diffuse it down through the rest of the state.  
Therefore, Jamaat is designed to work within democracy.  While they pull no punches criticizing 
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“Western cultural globalization”, Jamaat in Bangladesh has accepted liberal parliamentary 
democracy as means to an end.  Working within Bangladeshi parliamentary politics allows the 
party to express itself in periodic elections to elect organizational leadership, debates, 
discussions, and consultations for policy making.128 
 This utilization of contemporary, secular parliamentary governing in Bangladesh is 
important when considering Jamaat’s support for the Rohingya.  As mentioned before, because 
of the shared sectarian identities and values in Islam, the Rohingya act as a boon to Jamaat 
electoral hopes.  This relationship would be moot if the Rohingya could not offer a path back to 
the government for Jamaat.  Even the ruling Awami League has voiced their concern about 
Jamaat exploiting the Rohingya crisis for political gain.129  Despite the dubious ethical motives 
behind Jamaat’s support for the migrants, the fact that the Rohingya may play an important role 
for the party as a voting base is vital to understanding and predicting their warm reception for the 
persecuted group.   
Jamaat-e-Islami Economics 
Finally, the economics of the Bangladesh Jamaat is one that shifts with the political 
environment.  It cannot be confined to such characteristics as liberal, socialist, protectionist, or 
regulated because, ideally, the society would be based on Islamic law as an “alternative” to both 
capitalism and socialism.130  However, according to Islam (author), Jamaat vacillates between 
the economic systems of two competing forms of politico-ideological actors in Bangladesh: the 
old, nationalist-populist regimes and those who propose economic liberalism, the Awami League 
dominating the former and the BNP the latter.131  This fits into what I have characterized Jamaat 
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as expressing themselves politically: aligning themselves with the BNP to regain entry into the 
Bangladeshi political arena.  The author goes on to describe Jamaat as a political actor that 
operates on the margins of the politico-ideological discourse that attacks the power bloc from the 
outside.132  The party keeps alive the sentiments of deprivation, inequality, and discrimination 
that fuels their battle against the party in power.  The Bangladesh Jamaat are currently locked in 
a battle with the Awami League, siding with the BNP.  This causes Jamaat to assume the 
economic structure that the BNP prefers, which is a liberal economy.   
 As mentioned earlier, the BNP’s economic ideology of a free-market has influenced their 
stance on the Rohingya in that they prefer an inclusionary policy as the migrants will feed the 
Bangladeshi economy that is already based on unskilled labor.  Because Jamaat-e-Islami is 
currently on the politico-ideological side of the BNP, they also share this opinion. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The integration and assimilation of immigrants and refugees and the policies governing 
them has been researched thoroughly.  Security, nationalism, ethnicity all play a role in the 
policies that are enacted when it comes to migrants residing in the host country.  What appears to 
be less researched is domestic party politics as a determinant to immigration policy, especially in 
a developing country where party politics amounts to little more than factional fighting for 
control of a country.  This paper highlighted the importance of party politics in determining 
immigration policy by selecting three parties within Bangladesh and reconciling the ideologies of 
those parties with the distinct policy they have on Rohingya migrants.  The Awami League, 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party, and Jamaat-e-Islami maintain distinct social and political attitudes 
that influence their stance on the Rohingya migrants.  Studying Bangladesh and its political 
dynamics provides interesting insight to how a developing country, prone to faction competition, 
enacts immigration policy.  
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RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 While the methodology and findings of this study have utilized the latest information on 
the crisis of the Rohingya in Bangladesh and Myanmar, this is an ever-developing situation and 
at the time of publication may fail to include the most recent of developments that could change 
the findings of the study.  I also make some assumptions about the Rohingya voting tendencies.  
These are based on the theoretical and empirical findings of scholars who have completed 
literature on immigration policy and party politics, Gary Freeman’s work in particular.  I rely on 
his work that links immigration policy to vote-maximizing political parties. I also rely on 
Jonathan Fox’s work that links patterns of systematic discrimination to ethnic makeup, making a 
connection between discrimination, voting, and immigration policy.  Unfortunately, empirical 
evidence of Rohingya voting tendencies are unavailable as they are a stateless group and have 
been denied the right to vote in both Myanmar and Bangladesh.  For future research, it would be 
imperative to visit and interview a swath of Rohingya immigrants, both for their accounts of their 
treatment at the hands of the Bangladeshi government and their attitude towards the political 
parties that I have discussed in this study.  The Rohingya crisis, is one that is quickly becoming 
dire.  It is vital for popular as well as academic attention to remain on the actions of both the 
Burmese and Bangladeshi governments.   
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